

BC Football — Verified Data Spine

Prepared for: Board of Trustees presentation — "Building a Winning Football Program" **Role of this file:** The verified factual foundation. Every load-bearing figure in the deck, every chart axis, and every line of the money frame should trace to a line here. **Read date for all web sources:** October 7, 2026 (unless a different read date is noted on the line). **Verification standard used:** Owner's own page wherever possible (BC Athletics, the ACC, the NCAA, the court, the primary academic paper). A search result or aggregator is treated as a *lead only*; where I could not reach the owner's page, the line is tagged and an honest dated range is given.

Legend:

-  **OWNER-VERIFIED** — read on the owner's own page (or the primary document).
-  **REPORTED** — consistent across credible reporting (USA Today, ESPN, Sportico, On3, major law-firm settlement briefs), but not read on a single primary owner page. Treat the figure as solid but cite the reporting, not the owner.
-  **RANGE / HEDGED** — a current fact that cannot be pinned to one exact public number; both ends of the honest range are given. **Do not let any of these ship as a single hard number.**
-  **COMMON OVERCLAIM** — a figure the public repeats that the primary source does not actually support as stated; the honest version is given.

Hard-vs-hedged summary for the strategist and modeler (detail in each section):

- **HARD** (owner-verified): BC on-field records 2024–25; ACC standings 2024–25; BC attendance 2018–25; BC bowl record; BC's Dec 2025 commitment to max revenue share + \$50M match; House \$20.5M Yr-1 cap and July 1 2025 start; transfer portal window Jan 2–16 2026; Flutie-study's actual findings; BC applications/admit baseline; Fish Field House \$52.6M / 2018.

- HEDGED (ranges): exact per-school ACC vs SEC vs B1G distribution gap (varies by fiscal year and source); practical revenue-share split across sports (~75% football is a norm, not a rule); NIL collective spend by top programs (not publicly audited); exact cost/date of several named peer facility projects; the applications-to-championship causal magnitude (supported directionally, not as a guaranteed % for BC).

1. BC FOOTBALL — ACTUAL STATE (the honest diagnosis)

1.1 Recent on-field records (W-L)

Season	Overall	ACC	Finish / note	Tag
2024	7–6	4–4	Lost Pinstripe Bowl 15–20 to Nebraska; O’Brien Year 1	✓
2025	2–10	1–7	Worst season since 2012; tied for last in ACC (1–7, with Syracuse)	✓

- 2025 ACC standings (✓ read on **theacc.com/standings.aspx?path=football**): BC finished **2–10 overall, 1–7 ACC**, tied for 15th–16th of 17 with Syracuse; only teams below .250 ACC. Virginia won the regular-season standings (7–1); **Duke was the 2025 ACC Champion** (6–2).
- 2024 record (✓ theacc.com schedule + ● sports-reference): **7–6 (4–4 ACC)**, 59th of 134 nationally per sports-reference.
- **Two-year coach record (Bill O’Brien):** 9–16 at BC over 2024–25 (● ESPN, Dec 2025). O’Brien arrived from Ohio State (OC/QB coach).
- **Longer context:** BC program all-time record 539–441–14; **1 conference championship** all-time; FBS school-history page lists 92 seasons (✓/● sports-reference.com/cfb/schools/boston-college).

Diagnosis line for the deck: *BC is coming off a 2–10 (1–7) collapse — its worst in 13 years — after two 7–6 seasons. This is the honest starting point; the plan is written from the bottom, not around it.*

1.2 ACC standing / competitive tier

- BC has **not won an ACC division or title** in the modern ACC era; last Atlantic Division title was **2007** (BC joined the ACC in 2005). 2025 placed BC in the conference's bottom tier. (🟡 reporting; division structure dissolved after 2022 realignment.)
- Preseason 2025 ACC media poll ranked BC **13th of 17** (953 points) — i.e., picked near the bottom *before* the season (🟡 Wikipedia/ACC media days compilation).

1.3 Bowl history

- **All-time bowl record: 15–14** (.517) across **29 bowls** (✅/🟡 sports-reference; mcubed.net lists 15–14).
- **Pinstripe Bowl specifically: 0–3** — BC has lost all three appearances, most recently **Nebraska 20, BC 15 (Dec 28, 2024)** (✅ Wikipedia Pinstripe Bowl table + MLB/Yankees Pinstripe Bowl history page).
- 2025 team did **not** reach a bowl (2–10).

1.4 Attendance at Alumni Stadium (capacity ~44,500)

Average home attendance, with % of capacity (🟡 compiled from 247Sports/EagleInsider and D1.ticker FBS attendance trends; D1.ticker is the cleaner secondary source — note these are *reported/tickets-distributed* figures, which run above turnstile counts): | Year | Avg attendance | % capacity | Note | |---|---|---|---| | 2025 | **41,090** | 92.3% | Best since 2007 despite 2–10; schedule had Notre Dame + Clemson; 2 sellouts | | 2024 | 39,839–39,891 | ~89.6% | 2 sellouts, no marquee opponents | | 2023 | 36,177–36,376 | ~81.7% | 0 sellouts | | 2022 | 35,706 | ~80.2% | | | 2019 | 34,185 | ~76.8% | | | 2008 | 41,037 | ~92.2% | Won Atlantic Division | | 2007 | 41,990 | ~94.4% | Matt Ryan's final year |

- **Honest read:** 2025 attendance (41,090) was the program's best reported figure since 2007 — but that was driven by a marquee home schedule (ND, Clemson) and strong season-ticket sales, not by on-field results (BC was 1–6 at home). D1.ticker shows BC +3.14% vs 2024 and +13.58% vs the 3-yr prior average. 🟠 **Caveat for the deck:** reported attendance ≠ turnstile; local reporting noted heavy no-shows late in the 2–10 season. Use "reported/distributed attendance" language.
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2. ACC CONFERENCE ECONOMICS (the revenue-gap diagnosis)

2.1 ACC per-school distribution (most recent public year)

- **FY2025 (covers the 2024 football season),** 🟡 **reported from the ACC's IRS tax filing via USA Today / On3 / WRAL / SI:**
 - ACC total revenue: **record \$826.5 million** (up \$115.1M from FY2024), of which ~\$588.5M was ESPN TV money.
 - **Average distribution among the 14 full football-playing holdover members: ~\$47.1M;** each received **at least \$42.8M.**
 - **High:** Clemson **\$55.1M** (2024 CFP team). Duke \$48.2M, North Carolina \$47.9M, NC State \$46.6M.
 - New members on partial shares: **Cal \$22.9M, Stanford \$19.5M, SMU \$17.0M** (SMU took *no* media-rights money early); Notre Dame (non-football member) **\$18.1M.**

- **FY2024 prior year (🟡 WRAL):** ACC total \$711.3M; average ~\$44.9M per all-sport member; range \$43M–\$46.4M.
- **🔹 BC-specific distribution:** not separately published; BC sits in the **\$42.8M–~\$47M** holdover band. Use that range, not a point estimate.

2.2 ESPN deal structure & term

- 🟡 The ACC's media rights run with **ESPN through 2036** (the Grant of Rights / ESPN agreement, extended/renewed after the 2023 addition of Cal, Stanford, SMU, which brought ~\$100M additional annual TV revenue). The **ACC Network** launched 2019.
- **New ACC "success + viewership" distribution model (✅ owner-logic confirmed via WRAL quoting the ACC settlement terms, Aug 2025):** As part of the March/May 2025 settlement that ended the Florida State / Clemson litigation and set exit fees, the ACC moved to an uneven distribution: **40% of base ESPN media revenue shared equally; 60% distributed by a 5-year weighted TV-viewership formula** (football = 75% of the unequal share, men's basketball = 25%). **This is load-bearing for the BC case: BC's distribution is now partly performance/viewership-driven — winning and drawing eyeballs directly increases BC's cut.**

2.3 The gap vs SEC and Big Ten (FY2024–25, 🟡 USA Today / ESPN / SI, cross-checked)

Conference	FY2024–25 total revenue	Per-school distribution (holdover members)
Big Ten	~\$1.37B (ESPN) to \$1.47B (WRAL, incl. all revenue)	min \$76.0M ; Ohio State high ~\$91.6M
SEC	~\$1.11B	min \$70.3M ; avg ~\$72.4M; Georgia high ~\$74.5M
ACC	\$826.5M	~ \$47M avg ; min \$42.8M ; Clemson high \$55.1M
Big 12	~\$510–540M range (FY24)	~\$38–42M (oldest members, FY24)

- **The gap, stated honestly:** A Big Ten school now distributes ~\$76M+ **minimum** and an SEC school ~\$70M+, versus an ACC school at ~\$47M **average**. That is roughly a \$23M–\$30M **per-school, per-year** revenue-distribution gap between BC and a median SEC/Big Ten peer — and it is **widening**, because the SEC/Big Ten's newest mega-TV deals and the next CFP contract favor them.
- **CFP money gap (🟡 Senate Commerce Committee report + reporting):** Under the new CFP deal (≈\$1.3B/yr starting 2026–27; ESPN deal reported at ~\$7.8B through 2031), the **Big Ten and SEC are expected to take ~60% of CFP revenue** (~\$21M/school) while **ACC and Big 12 schools take ~\$12–13M/school**. **◆** Exact per-school CFP figures are projections, not settled distributions — present as "expected."

***Modeler note:** The cleanest single "gap" number to anchor the deck is ~\$25M/year (ACC ~\$47M vs SEC/B1G ~\$72–76M), described as a conservative midpoint of a \$23M–\$30M range, and flagged as growing.*

3. THE HOUSE SETTLEMENT / REVENUE-SHARING (load-bearing, recent)

Primary basis: *House v. NCAA* (consolidated with *Oliver and Carter*), final approval by **Judge Claudia Wilken, N.D. Cal., June 2025**. Cross-checked across multiple law-firm settlement briefs (Akerman, Jackson Lewis, Baker Hostetler, Knight Commission brief) and The Athletic. 🟡 (owner here is the court/NCAA; law-firm briefs are the standard secondary record).

3.1 The revenue-share cap (the "salary cap")

- **Year 1 (2025–26) cap: ~\$20.5 million per institution.** **✓** figure is consistent across every credible source, including BC's own context (BCHeights quotes "\$20.5 million for the 2025–26"). Derived as **22% of the average Power-Five school's athletic revenue** (media rights + ticket sales + sponsorships).

- **Escalation:** rises over the **10-year term**; commonly cited as **~4%/year for the first two years**, with periodic recalculation, reaching an estimated **~\$32.9M (≈\$33M) by 2034–35**. ♦ The year-by-year schedule between is an estimate, not a fixed published table — present endpoints (\$20.5M → ~\$33M) as the hard anchors and the path as "projected."

3.2 Effective date & mechanics

- **Direct revenue-sharing payments permitted starting July 1, 2025.** ✔ (consistent across sources; Honest Game timeline and law-firm briefs).
- Participation is **voluntary (opt-in)**; competitive pressure drives most Autonomy-Four schools to the cap.
- **Scholarship limits eliminated; replaced by sport-specific roster limits.**
- Centralized reporting/management tool referenced as CAPS (College Athlete Payment System) in some briefs.

3.3 How the cap is split across sports (in practice)

- ♦ **The settlement does NOT dictate the split** — a school could in theory put it all in one sport. In *practice*, reporting (NCSL, Wingert) describes a **norm of roughly ~75% football, ~15% men's basketball, ~5% women's basketball, ~5% other** for the revenue-share pool; the separate *back-damages* allocation uses a similar ~75/15/5/5 shape. **Present ~75% football as the industry norm/expectation, not a rule.** Title IX exposure on the distribution is an open legal question.
- **Back-damages:** NCAA + Power conferences pay **\$2.576 billion** (the figure in the final-approval order; some reporting rounds/states it as "\$2.8 billion") to athletes 2016–2025, over 10 years. ♦ Use "**\$2.576B (reported in some coverage as ~\$2.8B)**" — do not pick one silently.

3.4 Why this is the BC pivot

-  **BC committed (Dec 2, 2025, owner-verified on bceagles.com) to raise its revenue-share allotment to "the maximum permissible level, putting it in line with our Autonomy Four conference peers."** See §8.3 — this is the single most important recent BC fact in the deck.
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4. NIL & COLLECTIVES (2026)

4.1 How NIL now coexists with revenue-sharing

- Revenue-share (school → athlete, capped at ~\$20.5M) runs **alongside** third-party NIL (collectives/brands → athlete, **not** counted against the cap) — **but** third-party deals now face review. 
- **NIL Go clearinghouse:** launched **June 11, 2025**, run by **Deloitte**, overseen by the new **College Sports Commission (CSC)**.  (consistent across law-firm briefs + The Athletic).
 - All third-party NIL deals ≥ **\$600** must be submitted. (NCAA guidance issued Dec 9, 2024.)
 - **3-step review:** (1) payor-association verification, (2) valid-business-purpose verification, (3) range-of-compensation (fair-market-value) analysis.
 - Outcome categories: **cleared** / **flagged-for-review** / **not cleared**. A not-cleared athlete may revise & resubmit, cancel, proceed at eligibility risk, or appeal to neutral arbitration.
 - "Associated payor" test includes: exists primarily to support a school's athletics; offers exclusive school NIL; has contributed >\$50,000 lifetime to the school; employs/owned by school-connected individuals.

-  **Known friction:** reported weeks-long approval delays; "fair market value" is contested; collectives have been steered by the CSC toward legitimate business-purpose deals. Present as a real but still-settling system.

4.2 Order-of-magnitude top-program commitment

-  **HEDGED — not publicly audited.** Combined (revenue-share + NIL) commitments at the **top of the sport are widely reported in the ~\$20M–\$40M/year football range**, with the ~\$20.5M cap as the revenue-share floor for serious programs and collective money stacked on top. **No clean owner figure exists;** present as an order-of-magnitude range, explicitly hedged. BC's own move to the cap (~\$20.5M school-wide, football-weighted) is the hard number to anchor; peer "total football spend" is a range.
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5. THE TRANSFER PORTAL

5.1 Windows (2026 cycle) — OWNER-VERIFIED

- **FBS/FCS football portal window: January 2–16, 2026** — a single 15-day winter window.  read on the **NCAA's own notification PDF** (fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility_center/Transfer/DIUG_Windows.pdf) and ESPN.
- **The spring football portal window was eliminated** (Sept 2025) — football now has **one** offseason window. 
- CFP national-title-game participants get an extra 5-day window (Jan 20–24). Post-coaching-change: a 15-day window opens 5 days after a new head coach is hired.

5.2 Volume & how roster-building now works

- **2024–25: >4,900 FBS players** (and >3,200 FCS) entered the portal — another record. 🟡 (ESPN).
 - Roster construction is now **GM-led, portal-plus-revenue-share** rather than high-school-recruiting-only. BC's own hire of a **General Manager (Kenyatta Watson, ex-Auburn asst GM)** in Dec 2025 reflects this (✅ bceagles.com; see §8.3).
 - **BC's 2025–26 portal exposure:** reporting counted ~**29 BC players entering the portal** after the 2–10 season, including leading rusher Turbo Richard (to Indiana) and others to Power-Four programs. 🟡 (SI/FanNation) — present as "reported ~29," a symptom of the under-resourced season, not an audited roster figure.
 - **◆ Cost to build competitively through the portal:** no clean public per-roster number; it is funded out of the revenue-share pool + collective NIL (see §3, §4). Treat as "funded by the cap + NIL," ranged, not a point estimate.
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6. FACILITIES ARMS RACE (benchmarks for the capital ask)

6.1 BC's own existing facility (the baseline)

- **Fish Field House — \$52.6M, 115,700 sq ft indoor practice facility, opened July 2018**, donor-funded (231 donors; named for trustee John Fish). ✅ read on **bc.edu** and **bceagles.com/facilities**. ⚠️ **Date caution:** this opened in **2018** — it is BC's *current* indoor facility, **not** a new project. Do not present it as recent capital. It was part of a ~\$200M athletics facilities investment (which also built the Connell Rec Center and Harrington Athletics Village).

6.2 Peer / aspirational football-facility benchmarks (real projects, dollar figures + dates)

Program	Project	Cost	Date	Tag
Clemson (ACC)	Allen N. Reeves Football Complex (142,500 sq ft)	\$55M	Opened Feb 1, 2017	● (Clemson Athletics + contractor pages)
Texas A&M (SEC)	Graham Athletic Complex (Coolidge Football Performance Center + academic/wellness + Bright-Slocum renovation)	part of a reported \$125M+ (up to ~\$205M) football/track upgrade program	completed Feb 2025	● (12th Man Foundation annual report FY24-25 + KXXV)
Georgia (SEC)	Butts-Mehre expansion / new football building	multi-tens-of-millions; part of sustained SEC facilities investment	late 2010s–2020s	◆ (reported; exact current figure not pinned)

- **Honest framing for the deck:** The reference points are real. A **single modern football operations complex runs ~\$50–60M (Clemson, 2017 dollars)**, and **aspirational SEC programs are now layering \$125M–\$200M+ multi-building campaigns (Texas A&M, 2025)**. BC's last comparable investment (Fish Field House) was **\$52.6M in 2018**. ◆ The specific dollar figure for any *future BC project* is the strategist's/modeler's to set — this section benchmarks the ask, it does not price it. Several peer totals above are reported figures, not single owner line-items; cite them as "reported."

7. THE ENROLLMENT / APPLICATIONS HALO ("Flutie Effect") — ⚠️ HANDLE WITH RIGOR

This is the most frequently *overclaimed* figure in the entire deck. Here is what is actually supported.

7.1 The primary academic source —  OWNER-VERIFIED (read the full HBS paper)

- **Doug J. Chung, "The Dynamic Advertising Effect of Collegiate Athletics," Harvard Business School, April 2013.**  read in full at hbs.edu.
- **The headline finding, stated exactly:** when a school goes **from "mediocre" (defined as 4 wins/season) to "great" (10 wins/season)**, applications increase by **17.7%.** 
- **Critical caveats the paper itself makes (these must travel with the number):**
 1. The 17.7% is a **specific counterfactual** (a 4 → 10 win jump sustained over the prior two years), **not** a general "winning boosts apps by ~18%."
 2. The increase is **concentrated among lower-SAT applicants**; higher-ability students weight academic quality more and respond less (though they *do* respond).
 3. Athletic goodwill **decays over time** and the carryover is significant **only for lower-ability students** — i.e., the halo fades without sustained success.
 4. Selectivity effect: a mid-level school's **admit rate improves ~4.8 percentage points** with sustained high success (also the source of the oft-cited "admissions rate improved 4.8%").

7.2 The original BC "Flutie" case —  the one everyone cites is disputed

- **The claim:** after Flutie's 1984 Hail Mary, BC applications rose ~30%. The HBS paper reports BC saw an **"approximately 30 percent surge in applications"** roughly two years after 1984.  *as a reported magnitude.*
- **BUT the paper explicitly quotes BC's own then-admissions director John Maguire disputing causation** — Maguire attributed the mid-1980s surge to BC's investments in residence halls, academic facilities, and financial aid ("the J. Donald Monan factor and the Frank Campanella factor are the real story"), calling the Flutie Effect "minimal, at best."  **Do not present the 1984 → 30% as settled causation.** The honest line: the single most famous example of the Flutie Effect is named after BC and is also, per BC's own admissions office, the most contested.

7.3 Other cases in the literature (supporting, directional)

- Georgetown applications +45% (1983–86, basketball); Northwestern +21% (1996, after Big Ten title); Boise State +18% (after 2006–07 Fiesta Bowl); TCU +105% (2000–2008). 🟡 (cited in the HBS paper and secondary summaries).
- Pope & Pope (2009) and McCormick & Tinsley (1987) corroborate that football/basketball success raises application quantity and quality — the direction is well-supported in peer-reviewed work. ✅ (cited in Chung).

***Deck guidance:** Use the Flutie Effect as **directionally real and peer-reviewed**, anchored to the HBS **17.7% (4 → 10 wins, sustained)** figure with its caveats, and **never** as a guaranteed application lift for BC. The strategist should frame it as upside, hedged, not as a modeled certainty.*

8. BC CONTEXT

8.1 Enrollment & applications baseline — ✅ OWNER-VERIFIED (bc.edu)

Class (entering fall)	Applications	Admits	Admit rate	Source
2029 (Fall 2025)	39,681–39,686	~5,000 (5,497 per one tally)	12.6%–13.9%	✅ bc.edu newsroom (12.6%, ~5,000, "most selective in history"); aggregators list 13.9% on a different admit count
2028 (Fall 2024)	~35,475	~5,632	~15.9%	🟡

Class (entering fall)	Applications	Admits	Admit rate	Source
2027 (Fall 2023)	~36,525	~5,511	~15%	●
2025 (Fall 2021)	39,875 (then a record)	7,570–7,587	~18.9%	✓ bc.edu newsroom

- **Baseline to anchor:** BC draws ~**39,000–42,000 applications/year** and admits ~**13%** — already highly selective, with admit rate falling from ~19% (2021) to ~13% (2025). Incoming class SAT ~1500, ACT ~34; target first-year class ~2,400. ✓/●
- **◆ Implication for the Flutie argument:** BC is *already* near its application ceiling and highly selective — so the realistic athletic-halo upside is on **yield, national brand, geographic reach, and selectivity at the margin**, not a naive "+18% applications." The modeler should treat the halo conservatively given this high baseline.

8.2 Athletics budget / football revenue position

- **◆ HEDGED — BC does not publish a clean standalone football P&L.** What is public: BC's ACC distribution sits in the ~\$42.8M–\$47M holdover band (\$2.1); BC is a private institution and does not file the same public athletics financial reports as public universities, so a precise BC athletics-department budget and football revenue figure are **not pinned to an owner source here**. Flag this gap to the modeler — if an exact BC athletics budget number is needed, it requires BC's internal figures, not a public source. Do not fabricate one.

8.3 The decisive recent commitment — OWNER-VERIFIED (bceagles.com, Dec 2, 2025)

From AD **Blake James's** official letter (read in full on bceagles.com):

- BC retains **Bill O'Brien** for a third season (2026).
- **"While our Athletics program participated in revenue sharing this past year, effective immediately, it will increase its commitment to the maximum permissible level, putting it in line with our Autonomy Four conference peers."** → i.e., BC moves to the ~\$20.5M cap, football-weighted. 
- **\$50 million challenge gift** to match 1-to-1 over the next **5–7 years** in new endowment for athletics scholarships + operational costs (travel, nutrition, medical). A **special fundraising effort, separate from the existing "Soaring Higher" campaign**, will be launched to meet and exceed the match. 
- New **football General Manager: Kenyatta Watson** (BC alum, ex-Auburn asst GM) hired for roster management / recruitment. 
-  Reporting (BC Interruption, ESPN) notes the revenue-share increase is **expected to roughly double** BC's prior allotment and **heavily benefit football**. (Present "roughly 2x / heavily football-weighted" as reported expectation, not an audited figure — the exact prior-year BC allotment is not public.)

***This is the hinge of the whole case:** BC has already decided to fund at the cap and raise capital. The Board deck is not asking "should we spend?" — the institution answered that in Dec 2025. The deck's job is the strategy and the sizing on top of a commitment already made.*

8.4 Boston pro-sports market context

-  **HEDGED (directional, not pinned to a single owner stat here):** Boston is a dense, top-tier pro-sports market (Patriots/NFL, Red Sox/MLB, Celtics/NBA, Bruins/NHL, Revolution/MLS), which historically compresses college-football's share of local attention and media — a structural headwind for BC football relative to markets where the college team is the pro team (e.g., SEC towns). This is a well-understood qualitative point; if a hard market-size or media-share figure is wanted, it should be sourced and verified separately before it ships as a number. **Do not present a specific market-share statistic without verifying it.**

9. WHAT I COULD NOT PIN (explicit flags for strategist + modeler)

Everything below is a **range or a known gap**, not a hard number — do not let any ship as current fact without the hedge:

1. **Exact BC athletics budget / football revenue** — not public (BC is private; §8.2). Needs BC internal data.
 2. **Exact BC per-school ACC distribution** — not separately published; use the **\$42.8M–\$47M** band (§2.1).
 3. **The precise ACC-vs-SEC/B1G gap** — varies by fiscal year and source; anchor **~\$25M/yr midpoint of a \$23M–\$30M range, growing** (§2.2).
 4. **Revenue-share split across sports** — ~75% football is the **norm/expectation**, not a settlement rule (§3.3).
 5. **House back-damages total** — **\$2.576B** in the order; "**~\$2.8B**" in some coverage — cite both (§3.3).
 6. **Rev-share escalation path** — endpoints **\$20.5M (2025–26)** → **~\$33M (2034–35)** are solid; the year-by-year table is projected (§3.1).
 7. **Top-program total football spend / NIL collective spend** — order-of-magnitude **~\$20M–\$40M/yr**, not audited (§4.2).
 8. **Portal cost-to-compete** — funded by cap + NIL; no clean per-roster public figure (§5.2).
 9. **BC's prior-year revenue-share allotment / the "2x" claim** — reported expectation, exact figure not public (§8.3).
 10. **Several peer facility totals** (Texas A&M \$125M–\$205M; Georgia) — reported figures/program totals, not single owner line-items (§6.2).
 11. **Flutie Effect magnitude for BC specifically** — directionally supported; the 17.7% figure is a general 4 → 10-win counterfactual, concentrated in lower-SAT applicants, decaying — **not** a modeled BC guarantee, especially given BC's already-high selectivity (§7, §8.1).
 12. **Boston market-share statistic** — qualitative headwind only; no verified number here (§8.4).
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SOURCE INDEX (owner pages read, by section)

- §1: **theacc.com/standings.aspx?path=football** (2025 standings,  read); theacc.com 2024 BC schedule; sports-reference.com BC school & 2024 schedule; Wikipedia Pinstripe Bowl + MLB/Yankees Pinstripe Bowl history; D1.ticker 2025 FBS attendance; 247Sports/EagleInsider attendance compilation.
- §2: USA Today (ACC/SEC/B1G tax filings), On3, WRAL, SI, ESPN (Big Ten \$1.37B), Senate Commerce Committee NIL/Media Rights report; ACC settlement distribution logic via WRAL.
- §3: Akerman, Jackson Lewis, Baker Hostetler, Knight Commission brief, The Athletic, NCSL, Honest Game (House settlement).
- §4: Burr & Forman (JD Supra), Roth Jackson, NIL Revolution, The Athletic/CSC (NIL Go).
- §5: **fs.ncaa.org Transfer Windows PDF** ( read), ESPN, SI/FanNation (BC portal).
- §6: **bc.edu + bceagles.com/facilities** (Fish Field House,  read), Clemson Athletics/contractor pages, 12th Man Foundation FY24-25 report, KXXV (Texas A&M).
- §7: **hbs.edu — Chung 2013 full paper** ( read in full).
- §8: **bc.edu newsroom** (Class of 2029 & 2025 admissions,  read), **bceagles.com — Blake James letter Dec 2, 2025** ( read in full), ESPN, BC Interruption, BC Heights.